This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science.
Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has faced a multi-cultural experience of immigration (Bauer et al., 2005) . In the period up to the 1970s immigrants have been actively recruited from Southern Europe to match increased demand for low skilled labour in Germany's postwar economic boom. Since the end of the guest-worker recruitment era in 1973, the ethnic composition of immigration to Germany has changed substantially.
Today, Germany has a sizeable community of ethnic Germans who originate predominantly from Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. This is a relatively young group of immigrants who arrived during the late 1980s and early 1990s and who received German citizenship upon arrival. Another large group that has arrived since the 1990s are the politically persecuted and refugees of war. This group in itself is very heterogeneous, including sending countries as diverse as Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. This change in ethnic composition among entry cohorts implies a respectable degree of heterogeneity in educational backgrounds and German language capabilities. Expectation about assimilation behaviour should dier for each group.
Assimilation behaviour is traditionally tested in the framework of the assimilation hypothesis, an idea originally proposed by Chiswick (1978) . It states that immigrants suer an initial earnings disadvantage upon arrival vis-à-vis comparable natives. With years of residence, the initial earnings gap is expected to disappear. According to this idea, immigrants experience a steeper experience-earnings prole than natives, because they invest more in country-specic human capital accumulation due to lower opportunity cost (Dulep and Regets, 1999) . The greater the initial disadvantage, the greater the incentive to acquire country-specic knowledge and therefore the faster the assimilation process. For the US, empirical tests of the assimilation hypothesis suggest a catch-up of foreigners with comparable natives after 10 to 15 years (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980) . Proponents of this view argue that those immigrants that exceed the average earnings of comparable natives are positively self-selected in terms of unobservable characteristics 1 (Chiswick, 1978) . The assimilation hypothesis is criticized by Borjas (1985 Borjas ( , 1995 who argues that the positive and signicant coecients on years of residence typically estimated from cross-sectional data only capture a secular decline in the productivity of later immigrant cohorts. To support his argument, Borjas (1985) uses synthetic cohorts, that is following over time samples dened by year of immigration and age. The latter approach is however problematic in itself as it cannot capture selective migration, changes in the composition of samples over time or disentangle longitudinal changes from period eects (Chiswick et al., 2002) .
The assimilation hypothesis in the framework of cross-sectional or pooled analysis has been the guiding analytical framework in assessing the degree of economic integration of immigrants in Germany. The majority of empirical work tests for a concave or a linear 1 earnings assimilation prole as a function of years of residence of guest-workers assuming the assimilation prole to be homogeneous across cohorts. Various studies yield, however, dierent results. Bauer et al. (2005) , Licht and Steiner (1994) , Schmidt (1997) and Pischke (1992) conclude that earnings of immigrants do not assimilate to those of comparable German natives over time, despite a large initial earnings dierential upon arrival. Schmidt (1993) , for blue-collar workers, and Constant and Massey (2005) nd evidence for assimilation that takes place somewhere between17 to 23 years, respectively.
Initial earnings dierentials are explained by education (Schmidt, 1997; Constant and Massey, 2005) or country of origin dierences (Schmidt, 1992) , the latter being a proxy for dierences in the quality of origin-country education or labour market experience gathered in the home country. Others explain the speed of assimilation over time by proxies for the actual investment in destination country-specic human capital. Dustmann (1993 Dustmann ( , 1994 suggests that intended length of stay and language prociency are good predictors of economic assimilation.
In total, it is unclear whether long-run assimilation processes exist and whether these dier across immigrant cohorts. Also, little is known about the labour market assimilation of ethnic Germans. Two exceptions are Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) and Schmidt (1994b) who nd that ethnic Germans either do not have initial earnings disadvantages or that they eventually reach earnings parity with German natives. Both studies, however, use data collected before 1997. Last, we know only little about the economic position of immigrants from other countries of origin who arrived during the1990s.
Using 21 waves of the German Socio-Economic panel, we assess the long-term economic position in terms of earnings of immigrants vis-à-vis German natives. Exploiting the longitudinal nature of our data allows to control for time-invariant, individual unobserved heterogeneity such as ability or latent health. For instance, Toussant-Comeau (2004) stresses the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in determining occupational upward mobility of Hispanics in the US and estimates the assimilation coecient, i.e. the parameter picking up earnings dynamics, with a random eects specication. However, a random eects approach is limited to adjusting standard errors only rather than truly controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. In this case parameter estimates of upward mobility are more ecient, but they are still biased due to omitted variable bias. A xed eects specication would be more appropriate.
The size of our data enables us to test whether the results are driven by including quasi-second generation immigrants in our sample. These are identied as immigrants who arrived in Germany at very young age, whereas we exclude a priori all foreigners actually born in Germany 2 . Age at immigration might be important since immigrants arriving at a very young age in the host country are more likely to acquire destination country-specic human capital such as language skills and knowledge about entry requirements into local labour markets.
In spite of a variety of advantages, the use of long panel data-sets entail some problems.
The longer the sequence of waves the more likely it is that individuals systematically drop out of the sample. Panel attrition may bias estimation results if the probability of leaving the sample, either due to non-response or migration, is systematically linked to labour market outcomes. The empirical literature nds evidence for signicant selectivity in exiting behavior, even though biases are rather small (Ayala et al., 2006; Behr, 2004; Behr et al., 2003 Behr et al., , 2005 Becketti et al., 1988; Crouchley et al., 2002; Hausman and Wise, 1979; Lillard and Panis, 1998; Zabel, 1998; Ziliak and Kniesner, 1998) . The majority of studies investigate attrition bias for the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). For the GSOEP, work is limited to early waves of the data-set and does not dierentiate between immigrant sub-groups, except for Schmidt (1994b, p. 121) who nds that 43 percent of individuals in his sample of guest-workers drop-out due to non-participation. Rendtel (1990 Rendtel ( , 1995 suggest that the impact of socio-economic variables on the probability of participation disappears after the second wave in 1985. Pannenberg (2000) and Spiess and Pannenberg (2003) demonstrate that there is substantial attrition from the GSOEP due to refusal or moving abroad. In the context of economic assimilation only Licht and Steiner (1994) test whether panel attrition in the GSOEP is systematically linked to labour market outcomes of foreigners 3 . On the other hand, biased assimilation coecients could also be the result of selective returnmigration, a special case of panel attrition. Typical determinants of return-migration are duration of stay, education or labour income, and location of family in the host country (Brecht, 1994; Constant and Massey, 2005; Velling, 1994; Schmidt, 1994a) . Even though it is impossible to identify the actual return-migration in the GSOEP, we can model the decision to move abroad or the decision to stay in Germany. The underlying idea is that immigrants have a greater probability to move out of Germany than German natives and that their decision to move is highly linked with their duration of stay, income and educational background.
As a point of departure, we test the heterogeneity of economic assimilation proles by augmenting a standard earnings equation with period of entry (cohorts) indicators.
Cohorts are distinguished on the basis of changing immigration regimes, i.e. immigrants who arrived between 1955 -1968 , 1969 -1973 , 1974 -1987 , and 1988 and ethnic Germans arriving between 1988 To control for unobserved heterogeneity, the same specication is re-estimated by taking dierences from the mean. Technically, this method identies the earnings growth rates of the cohorts over time, but no longer their initial earnings dierences. Then, we model two possible sources of attrition bias. The two probabilities of participating in the interview and staying in Germany are corrected with a two-step Heckman sample selection model, modelling the two decision processes simultaneously. These estimates are used to calculate inverse Mills ratios separately for all foreigner cohorts and German natives. The challenge of this procedure is to identify appropriate exclusion restrictions for all groups. Last, we test the sensitivity of our results with respect to the sample denition by eliminating all individuals who could be dened as second generation immigrants.
We nd evidence for heterogeneity in the assimilation proles across cohorts for annual earnings. The assimilation hypothesis is conrmed for two cohorts only. Time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and systematic drop-out of the sample inuence the estimated speed of assimilation of these two groups, but the impact is still statistically signicant. A check of robustness with respect to the sample denition leaves results mainly unchanged.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the econometric framework with particular focus on the model to control for panel attrition and the choice of exclusion restrictions. Data issues are addressed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results and a checks for robustness, and in section 5 we summarize the ndings.
Econometric framework 2.1 Labour market outcomes
To compare the labour market outcome of foreigners relative to German natives we augment a standard Mincer equation of log earnings with years of residence and its square. Let Y it represent real annual gross earnings 4 for individuals i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T i (unbalanced panel) and take the natural logarithm of the column vectorY
where from now on we consider each enlisted variable as a column vector of dimension To allow the productivity to dier between immigrant cohorts (Borjas, 1985 (Borjas, , 1995 , the coecients of the intercept β g0 , years of residence β g1 and its square β g2 vary across all four groups of rst generation immigrants and ethnic Germans. The subscriptg for group refers to Cohort 5568, Cohort 6973, Cohort 7487, Cohort 8802 and ethnic Germans. The dummy variable D g equals one if the particular individual belongs to sub-groupg, and zero otherwise. Years of residence and its square are interacted with each sub-group dummy. 4 We use annual earnings since wages in Germany are relatively rigid. Employees have little inuence on the wage determination process. Thus, wages do not necessarily reect dierences in labour market productivity. Lacking wage exibility is particularly prevalent in the low skill sector, in which the majority of foreigners concentrate. 5 We are aware of the critique by Murphy (1990) and Yuengert (1994) who show that a quadratic specication might not be the appropriate functional form. However, we chose the quadratic simplication since our main interest is to investigate the various sources of bias to the conventionally tested assimilation hypothesis by Chiswick (1978) .
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The matrix W i includes a variety of individual-specic variables such as age, number of persons living in the household, marital status, and disability status. Workplace-specic variables such as the average hours worked per week and tenure at same rm are captured by the matrix H i . We allow for hours worked to control for part-time employees. For immigrants, age at entry into Germany is captured by I i for the sensitivity analysis only.
All other determinants of earnings that cannot be observed are aggregated in the normally distributed zero mean error u i . The main objects of interest in our analysis are the three parameter vectors β g0 , β g1 , and β g2 . Conditional on the specication, we impose various restrictions on the parameter vectors θ, γ, π, and ψ.
We do not include time xed eects to capture business cycle variations. If included, we would have to make the assumption that foreigners and German natives are aected equally by business cycle shocks in order to identify the parameters (Borjas, 1994) . This is the case because years of residence is a linear combination of the period eect and the year of immigration. Barth et al. (2004) have shown that equal period eect restrictions can produce biased estimates of assimilation and cohort eect, if the overall macroeconomic conditions have either a positive or negative trend. Since we use as dependent variable real earnings, that is adjusted to the price level, we can pick up ination trends.
We also refrain from including self-assessed language prociency as an explanatory variable as proposed by Dustmann (1994) and applied by Constant and Massey (2005) .
These subjective measures of language prociency are prone to misclassication error and thus estimated coecients may be severely biased (Dustmann and Van Soest, 2001) .
Moreover, language prociency may be endogenous with respect to labour market earnings.
In a rst step, we estimate Eq. (1) by pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), imposing the restriction of a zero coecient (ψ = 0) on the age at entry variable. In the pooled model we take advantage of the largest sample possible, which is particularly important given the small sample sizes of the immigrant sub-cohorts. In a second step, we re-estimate Eq. (1) with a linear xed eects specication to address potential omitted variable biases due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Eq. (2) results from the 7 assumption u it = α i + ε it and taking dierences from the mean. Only parameters of time-varying variables can be identied.
Panel attrition
The data used are unbalanced, the sequence of nonmissing observations varies across groups or even individuals. In this analysis we consider unit non-response only. On the one hand, individuals may refuse to participate any longer in the interview with no particular reason given. On the other hand individuals may drop out of the sample because they move abroad. If the underlying processes determining labour market outcomes correlates with those shaping the decision to participate or moving abroad OLS estimates are inconsistent (Heckman, 1979) . For instance, assume that a disproportionately high share of low-skilled migrants compared to German natives leaves the panel prematurely due to language problems. If this group of low-skilled immigrants also exhibits a lower earnings potential than the individuals staying in the panel, OLS estimates of their speed of assimilation would be biased upward. Similar arguments hold for the decision to stay in Germany. For instance, if high-skilled migrants exhibit a higher probability to stay in Germany than low-skilled foreigners due to better labor market opportunities, OLS parameter estimates are biased upwards. If this systematic link between the two processes is constant over time, xed eects estimation eliminates the bias. If not, even xed eects estimation yields unreliable parameter estimates.
We address systematic panel attrition by assuming the existence of an unobserved variable that aects both the earnings equation and the attrition process. Under the assumption 'missingness on unobservables' (Fitzgerald et al., 1998) the bias can be alleviated with a Heckman sample selection model (Hausman and Wise, 1979; Verbeek and Nijman, 1992) . Regarding the participation decision, we calculate the sample selection correction terms for German natives and ethnic Germans from a simple reduced form 8 probit model. For the dierent cohorts of rst generation immigrants we calculate the selection correction from a bivariate probit model that links the error terms of the decision to participate in the interview and to stay in Germany. To identify the parameter estimates in the selection model we need good and valid exclusion restrictions.
For German natives and ethnic Germans let p * ij be the true, but unobserved net utility from participating in the interview:
where j represents these two groups, L is the lag operator,L.X ij1 is a matrix of explanatory variables lagged by one time period, β j1 is vector of regression coecients, and ij1 is an error term. The regressor matrix may coincide with all variables in Eq.
(1). The vector L.Z ij1 captures the exclusion restrictions lagged by one time period and the 1 in the subscript refers to the participation decision.
We observe the individual to participate in the interview, p ij = 1, 6 if the true, underlying net utility from participating is greater than a threshold value, which we normalize to 0:
, then the probability to participate can be expressed as:
For German natives and ethnic Germans the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) can directly be estimated from a pooled probit model:
For the rst generation sub-cohorts, we model the decision to participate and to stay in Germany jointly. The participation decision of foreign immigrants is analogous to (3):
c representing Cohort 5568, Cohort 6973, Cohort 7487, and Cohort 8802. For the decision to stay in Germany let s * ci be the true, but unobservable net utility from staying in Germany:
where (L.X ic2 + L.Z ic2 ) = M c2 and θ c2 = (β c2 γ c2 ) . All variables are dened as above except for L.Z ic2 being the vector of exclusion restrictions for this process and the subscript 2 refers to the decision to stay..
We observe a foreigner to stay in Germany s ic = 1 7 if net utility from staying in Germany s * ic is greater than a threshold value, which we normalize to zero:
Assuming ic2 ∼ N (0, 1) the probability to stay in Germany can be expressed as
We further assume that the error terms of the two decisions are not independent from each other (cov( ic1 ic2 ) = ρ c = 0). The IMRs for the four dierent cohorts of rst generation immigrants have to be calculated from a bivariate probit model in which we account for partial observability (Poirier, 1980; Vella, 1998) . The error terms of (5) and (6) are 7 The proxy for staying in Germany s ic = 1 if the variable "success of interview" takes the value 5. This value represents moving out of Germany. For ethnic Germans we do not have to formalize this decision, because we obtain only four person-year observations for this group in our sample. assumed to be distributed as:
The log-likelihood is then:
where d icl = 2y icl − 1, l = 1, 2 and Φ bp is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. From this log-likelihood we obtain the bivariate probit Maximum Likelihood estimatesθ c1 andθ c2 that are used to calculate IMRs according to Vella (1998, p. 256) for each cohort c:λ
andλ
The selectivity-corrected earnings equation is:
where g refers to all groups, j to German natives and ethnic Germans, and c to rst generation cohorts, 1 stands for the decision to participate and 2 for the decision to stay.
The parameter vectors Γ j , Γ c1 Γ c2 represent the inuence of the inverse Mills ratios on earnings.
2.3 Exclusion Restrictions
A valid and good exclusion restriction, in our case Z, has to meet the following two conditions. It must not systematically correlate with the error term of the earnings equation
and it should signicantly correlate with the participation or the decision to stay equation ((ii) cov(L.Z 1 , p) = 0 and cov(L.Z 2 , s) = 0). The rst assumption requires that the exclusion restrictionZ lagged by one time-period must not correlate with the unobservables that determine the current decision to participate in the interview or to stay in Germany. It implies that the exclusion restriction of last period must not correlate with current labour market outcomes. Whether this assumption holds has to be judged by economic reasoning. The second assumption requires that the exclusion restriction correlates with the decision to participate and to stay in Germany.
It can be tested by imposing the Null-Hypothesis of H 0 : γ 1 = γ 2 = 0 in Eqs. (3), (5), and (6).
With respect to the participation decision, it is common to use`change of interviewer during the rst year since panel entry' (Behr, 2004; Rendtel, 1990; Spiess and Pannenberg, 2003; Willis and Hill, 2001) . The idea behind this instrument is that interviewees are more likely to continue to participate if the interviewer remains the same over the year. Working through the questionnaire in collaboration with the interviewer is time intensive and to answer authentically requires trust towards the interviewer. If the interviewer changes, an interviewee must build up a new relationship, a requirement which may cause uneasiness.
On the other hand, whether the interviewer changes does not inuence the labour market performance of the interviewee, since this decision is solely taken by the data collection agency.
With respect to the decision to stay in Germany, it is more complex to nd an appropriate exclusion restriction. The literature on return-migration identies relative deprivation, capital constraints, higher purchasing power in destination country or country-of-origin, or higher rates of return to self-employment as possible explanations for returning home (see e.g. (Dustmann, 2003) ). All of these factors are, nevertheless, intimately linked to the labour market position of an immigrant. Constant and Massey (2005) suggest that any variable that represents strong ties or attachment with the country of origin is a good predictor for the probability of moving abroad. Information on where relevant family members live, whether the family has children in schooling age, or whether the immigrant came from a war-torn country may proxy these locational preferences. We choose indicators for`number of children below the age 13',`spouse or child(ren) away', and`having left the country of origin due to war or seeking freedom'. The idea behind the exclusion restriction`number of children below the age 13' is that families who have several children younger than 13 years of age are more likely to stay in Germany because they do not want them to change the familiar schooling environment.
Children who undergo primary and secondary education nd themselves in a decisive period for developing intellectual and social skills. The more children of compulsory schooling age a family has, the more likely a family will decide in favour of staying. On the other hand, there is no empirical evidence that the actual number of children aged under 13 years exhibits an independent impact on the labour market position of the father 8 . Furthermore, a father whose child(ren) or spouse are living abroad will be more likely to return to the country where his family lives. Whether or not a part of the family stays abroad is more likely due to the particular immigration regime rather than due to the labour market outcome of the father.
Finally, whether an immigrant returns to his or her country-of-origin depends also on the motivation for migration. Immigrants who left their home countries to escape civil war or oppression of individual liberties are less likely to leave their host country as long as these conditions persist. On the other hand, whether or not such conditions are found in a specic country-of-origin is unlikely to be related to the labour market outcome of the particular immigrant. 8 There are some arguments in favor of an existing link between the number of children aged younger than 13 and labour market earnings. The more children a family has, the more child benets it receives. We use, however, gross annual earnings that exclude governmental transfers. On the other hand, the presence of children could motivate a family father to become more ambitious in his career. We found that the number of children in the time period before has no statistical signicant association with contemporaneous earnings.
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The former three instruments are used for the rst three foreigner cohorts. In addition to these instruments, the instrument of war in country-of-origin is used for the latest immigrant cohort. Parameter estimates for both decision processes are statistically signicant and are presented in Tables 7 and 8 Germans are identied as being born outside of Germany, holding a German citizenship, originating from Eastern Europe or Russia, and arriving in Germany after 1987. First generation immigrants are identied as being born outside Germany, entering Germany between 1955 and 2002, and holding a foreign nationality 9 . We further split this group of rst generation immigrants into sub-cohorts which are identied along the various immigration regimes described in Bauer et al. (2005, p. 206-211) .
We identify rst generation immigrants who entered during the guest-worker recruitment period between 1955 and 1973. Since empirically a much larger number of immigrants entered after 1968 than between 1955 and 1967 (see Fig. 1 and Schmidt (1994a, p . 121) 10 ) and since the last guest-worker agreement was signed in 1968, we distinguish between two groups of guest-workers. Those who entered between 1955 and 1968 are labelled Cohort 5568 and those who entered between 1969 and 1973 are labelled Cohort 6973. We opted for this sub-division of guest-workers to allow for a hypothetical systematic dierence between the earlier and the later recruits in terms of risk attitude. The 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 Proportion of immigrants between 1955 and 1973 earlier recruits may be interpreted as the pioneers who left their home country without social networks in Germany. The later recruits may have followed due to recommendations from fellow countrymen, who experienced the labour market opportunities, and due to the possibility of falling back on now existing social networks in Germany. Those immigrants who entered during family reunication between 1974 and 1987 are classied as Cohort 7487, and those who entered shortly before the fall of the Iron Curtain are classied as Cohort 8802. In total, we dispose of 9, 977 native Germans, 297 ethnic Germans, and 2, 152 rst generation immigrants. For rst generation immigrants we are left with487, 749, 487, and 244 individuals for cohorts 5586, 6973, 7487, and 8802, respectively. Table 1 presents the unconditional means of key socio-economic characteristics for all groups together with mean annual real gross labour earnings 11 (Tables 4 to 6 in the Appendix provide denitions for all variables). To account for the over-sampling of foreigners cross-sectional probability weights provided by the GSOEP are used. Longitudinal weights are not used since we explicitly model panel attrition. The vast majority of the rst three foreigner cohorts stems from the classical guest-worker countries ( 71 to 82 percent), whereas this holds for less than 50 percent of the latest foreign immigrant cohort.
Density
Hence, the nationality mix changed substantially in most recent years. Annual real gross earnings are the largest for native Germans, followed by Cohorts 5568, 6973, and 8802.
Ethnic Germans and Cohort 7487 have the lowest earnings. For the former group it may be due to their members shortest duration of stay in Germany. For the latter group it is because its members are the youngest of all groups 12 . These distributional dierences are exemplied in Fig. 2 for average earnings greater than 4, 800 Euro and smaller than 80, 000 Euro p.a.. The large fraction of individuals scattered around the4800 Euro limit are those employed in the Mini-job sector 13 . The latest immigrant cohort is the group, which arrived on average at a much older age (26 years) than the three previous cohorts (21, 22, 17 years, respectively). Cohort 7487 was on average the youngest cohort to arrive in Germany. Nearly 42 percent of them arrived in Germany at age younger than 15 years. This is probably due to the fact that the main channel of immigration during that time was family reunication. In this 12 The sample used does not include individuals with excessive real gross earnings for ethnic Germans. There were only six individuals whose real gross earnings exceeded 100, 000 Euro p.a.. Except for one individual, all hold a University degree and are older than37 years of age. We excluded three cases from the German sample. Those were two individuals with less than 12.5 years of education and aged below 23 years, who earned more than 400, 000 Euro p.a. and one technocrat aged 30 years who reported to earn more than 500, 000 Euro p.a.. 13 Those are individuals working part-time or on the basis of tax-free income of currently440 Euro per month. As the densities show, there is greater proportion of foreigners working in a Mini-job. Average earnings 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years Income difference 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years German Cohort 5568 Cohort 6973 Cohort 7487
Cohort 8802 and 6973. The latter implies that we cannot observe a concave assimilation prole for these two groups in the raw data. Sample sizes change at dierent degrees for dierent professional groups and they change dierently for the various sub-groups 16 . For all groups, sample sizes for individuals with a university degree diminish less strongly than for individuals with no professional training.
For ethnic Germans, for instance, from 1999 onwards there are more individuals who hold a set of dummy variables representing foreigner groups for each year. The parameter estimates of this raw method for each time period is used as data point. 15 Graphs with condence intervals are provided upon request. 16 The large hikes in 1999 are the result of the refreshment samples added to the GSOEP in1999. Sample size 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years Sample size 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years Sample size 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years Sample size 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years Sample size 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Years 
Annual earnings
Estimates for Eq. (1) are presented in Table 2 . In Model1 we regress the logarithm of real gross earnings on the sub-group indicators and the second order polynomial of years of residence. In Model 2 we extend this benchmark case by controlling for socio-demographic factors such as marital status, number of children, disability status, age and its square as well as the whole set of human capital indicators, i.e. type of secondary education and type of vocational training and workplace characteristics. Model3 estimates Eq. (9) correcting for panel attrition. These three models are estimated by pooled OLS (POLS).
In Model 4 we estimate Eq.
(2) to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, Model 5 combines Eqs. (2) and (9) assuming that the bias due to systematic drop-out of the sample is time-varying. In the latter two models we can only identify the coecient of the assimilation prole for each sub-group separately and we cannot compare this prole to German natives. The last two models are therefore a robustness-check for the estimates of the speed of assimilation.
Moving from Model 1 to Model 2 we replicate the important result from the literature that a large part of the initial earnings dierences between foreigners and German natives can be explained by education and training dierences. The only exception is Cohort 6973, but for all other groups the earnings gap decreases by at least20 percentage points.
The most interesting case is the parameter estimates for ethnic Germans. Estimation results suggest a statistically signicant concave earnings assimilation prole for ethnic Germans once controlling for education dierences. This prole is remarkably robust across Models 2 to 5. Upon entry to Germany members of this group earn between48
to 64 percent less than German natives 18 . However, their earnings grow substantially afterwards. In Model 2, for instance, four years of residence bring ethnic Germans a 10 precent increase in annual earnings. The quantitative extent of the initial earnings difference and catch-up to comparable natives critically depend on the chosen specication.
The coecient on years of residence decreases continuously from the full specication The latest foreign-born immigrant sub-group, Cohort8802 also exhibits a statistically signicant concave assimilation prole which is more robust across the various models Table 2 presents main estimation results on the assimilation proles. IMR = inverse Mills ratio, semi-elasticities for the sub-group dummy variables are calculated as the dierence (∆ j ) for each sub-group j vis-à-vis German natives as: ∆ j = exp(β 0,j ) − 1 (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980) . White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are reported at1 %( * * * ), 5 % ( * * ) and 10 % ( * ) than the one obtained for ethnic Germans. Controlling for the full set of education in Model 2 leaves this group with yet an initial earnings dierence of nearly 50 percent to comparable German natives. Their earnings also grow with every additional year of residence, for instance, by 8 percent for four additional years of residence in Germany.
This speed of assimilation is less strong when controlling for selective panel attrition in 
Whereas both ethnic Germans and members of Cohort5568 catch-up with comparable
German natives after less than 9 years, it takes members of Cohort 6973 nearly 16 years. Table 3 summarizes the main results of a checks for robustness to our preferred Model 2.
Model S1 imposes the restriction of a homogeneous parameter vector of the assimilation vector across all foreigner groups. Here we test whether allowing the assimilation path to dier across entry cohorts matters. In Model S2 we exclude all Turkish immigrants from our sample. The restriction is justied by the hypothesis that it is mostly Turkish immigrants that face economic assimilation problems. In Models S3 to S5 we test whether it is mainly second generation immigrants which are driving the optimistic catch-up rates.
Model S3 complements Model 2 with age at immigration as an additional regressor. Model S4 excludes all individuals who immigrated to Germany at an age younger than15. Model S5 excludes all immigrants whose potential labour market experience is smaller than their years of residence in Germany. This ensures that the sample includes only immigrants who did not undergo vocational training in Germany.
Not discriminating between entry cohorts for rst generation immigrants and ethnic
Germans (Model S1), we obtain an initial earnings dierence much smaller than those obtained for ethnic Germans, Cohort 8802 and Cohort 6973, but much greater than for Cohort 5568 and Cohort 7487. A formal F-Test imposing parameter homogeneity for the initial earnings dierences in Model 2 can be rejected at the ve percent signicance level 21 . In Fig. 6(a) we can show that catch-up for foreigners as a homogeneous group would take place after less than 11 years.
Our results by and large do not change by excluding selective foreigner groups from the sample. Comparing Model 2 with Model S2, in which we exclude the Turkish population from our sample yields no signicant change to your parameter estimates of interest. Fig.   6(b) shows that catch-up rates remain unchanged. Similar results are obtained when controlling for the second generation. Age at entry, even though statistically signicant with a negative sign for all rst generation entry cohorts, plays only a minor economic importance (Model S3). The only pronounced eect is observed for Cohort 6973, i.e.
the second wave of guest-worker recruitment, whose members experience a 2.5 percent earnings penalty, all other things equal, for each additional year of age at immigration.
Ethnic Germans still exhibit a signicantly concave earnings assimilation prole across all three models. Initial earnings dierences vary within a range of no dierence to around 11 percentage points when compared to Model 2. The quantitative dimension of the years of residence coecient for ethnic Germans varies between0.15 and 0.17 and is, thus, only slightly higher than in Model 2.
A slightly dierent picture emerges for Cohort 8802. This group still reveals a signicantly concave earnings prole in Model S4, which is the sample excluding all immigrants who were younger than 15 years of age upon entry. Initial earnings dierences grow by up to 15 percentage points in Model S4 and Model S5 vis-à-vis Model 2, but the speed of assimilation remains relatively constant across models. Fig. 6 (c) exemplies this change.
The rapid catch-up rates for Cohort 8802 are mainly driven by the second generation.
This group no longer reaches earnings parity with their native German peer group. For all other sub-groups the relevant estimates are insignicant and no clear pattern emerges. 21 We tested jointly for equality of the cohort intercepts and the quadratic years of residence proles after estimating the preferred Model 2: F( 4, 10993) = 3.03, Prob > F = 0.0164 testing equality intercept estimates for foreigners; F( 4, 10993) = 2.42, Prob > F = 0.0465 testing for equality of parameter vector of years of residence; and F( 4, 10993) = 2.67, Prob > F = 0.0304 for the equality of the parameter vector of the square of years of residence. whether the estimates of the assimilation proles are driven by potential dierences in unobserved productivity or human capital investments that determine the shape of the assimilation path between groups. In addition, we investigate the role of panel attrition in shaping the estimation results. Systematic exit from the sample is corrected in a two-step sample selection correction that models jointly the decision to participate in the interview and the decision to stay in Germany (Heckman, 1979) .
We nd heterogeneity in the assimilation proles across the ve identied groups.
With respect to annual earnings, ethnic Germans and the youngest group of foreign im- for US data (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980) . For the foreigner group which arrived between 1969 and 1973, we nd a atter assimilation prole. Catch-up for this group occurs after 16 years, an estimate which resembles the results of Schmidt (1993) and Constant and Massey (2005) . We cannot conrm the assimilation hypothesis for immigrants who arrived between 1955 and 1968 and between 1974 and 1987. Our estimates show neither statistically signicant initial dierences nor earnings growth rates in comparison to German natives. This might be due to the fact that we do not observe earnings dierences upon entry from 1955 onwards for these cohorts, but rather upon sample entry since1984.
Thus, assimilation proles are mainly identied with data points collected late along the assimilation path for Cohort 5568.
Our results further suggest that omitted variable and attrition bias play a minor quantitative role in these outcomes. Only for Cohort6973 we nd substantial dierences, indicating that this group is highly self-selected. Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity slightly biases the estimated assimilation proles upwards. Nevertheless, controlling for this bias with xed eects estimation still yields statistically signicant coecients on earnings growth. Regarding selective panel attrition, we nd that for most foreigner sub-groups and German natives alike unobservable factors that aect earnings positively, also impinge positively upon the decision to participate in the interview. Hence, individuals who perform relatively well in the labour market are also more likely to stay in the sample.
This result on foreigners is in line with results provided by Rendtel (1995) for the general population and the general literature on return-migration for Germany (Brecht, 1994; Constant and Massey, 2005; Velling, 1994; Schmidt, 1994a Table 7 reports coecients of a binary probit model that regresses the observation of not moving out of Germany on a set of regressors and instrumental variables (IV). Instruments used are the number of children below the age of 13 (No. child. < 13), Child away, Spouse away, and war or freedom. (N*T) = Number of person-year observations. Signicance levels are reported at 1 %( * * * ), 5 % ( * * ) and 10 % ( * ). Table 8 reports coecients of a binary probit model that regresses the observation of participating in the interview on a set of regressors and instrumental variables (IV) lagged by one time period. Instrument used is the change of interviewer after the rst year participating. GER = German, ETH GER = ethnic German, C5568 = Cohort 5568, C 6973 = Cohort 6973, and so on, (N*T) = Number of person-year observations. Signicance levels are reported at1 %( * * * ), 5 % ( * * ) and 10 % ( * ).
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